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Abstract
What I seek to do in this paper is to reemphasize what I see as the forgotten or neglected other half of 
the effective altruist equation. Effective altruists need to take seriously the ways in which their actions 
contribute to systemic inequality and structural violence. Charitable donation is not enough to create a 
paradigm shift or stop systemic injustice. In tackling systemic injustice, the ascetic response may allow 
effective altruists to attack the roots of the problem more directly. Further, the cost-benefit analysis and 
randomized controlled trials favored by the movement can produce distinctly biased perceptions that leave 
effective altruists blind to the political dimensions of many types of harm. Balancing ascetic approaches to 
combating suffering may temper the overzealous focus on cost-effective charities and make room for the 
support of the causes this narrow focus excludes. Ultimately, this paper defends the basic tenets of effective 
altruism: that we have a duty to reduce suffering in the world and that we should apply our powers of reason 
in order to make our labors maximally effective.
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Introduction
Effective altruism is characterized by several key premises. First and foremost is the 
idea that we ought to make the world a better place, and that we should apply our pow-
ers of reason to the efforts we make in that regard in order to make them maximally 
effective. We in the First World often have more money than we need to sustain our-
selves. Because of the current economic dynamics of the world, this means even small 
donations of what amounts to spare change for us can have significant effects on the 
lives of impoverished people in the Third World. These traits have led effective altruists 
to focus their attention on making donations to charities which have been evaluated for 
cost-effectiveness and which target the world’s poorest people. For this reason, effective 
altruism has a unique relationship to money and economics. This relationship produces 
a distinct skew in the way effective altruists approach the issues they target, and not 
always for the better. In particular, the idea of earning to give has gained some popular-
ity, leading some to seek high earning careers with little concern for the ethical impact 
of the nature of these careers in themselves. 
What I seek to do in this paper is to reemphasize what I see as the forgotten or neglect-
ed other half of the effective altruist equation. Effective altruists need to take seriously 
the ways in which their actions contribute to systemic inequality and structural vio-
lence. Donation is not enough to create a paradigm shift or to stop systemic injustice. 
In addition to considering cost-benefits as they relate to charitable donations, effective 
altruists should be mindful consumers and mobilize their inaction for good effects as 
well. In order to maximize our positive influence in the world, we must mobilize not 
only our activist instincts, but also our ascetic ones. We must be able to recognize not 
only the types of actions that can best effect positive change, but also the types of inac-
tion that can stall or reverse the root causes of suffering. Considering both our actions 
and inactions as representing equal opportunity for effecting change in the world gives 
us a more well-rounded picture of the moral landscape. This positions my article in 
favor of effective altruism’s core premises, but against the sub-trend of earning to give.
Addressing Systemic Injustice and the Question of the Efficacy of Aid
Given the resources and wealth we in the developed countries of the West often enjoy, 
this places a distinct burden on us to use this privilege for good. Similar to the idea that 
a doctor has special duties to help the sick because he or she has more knowledge and 
ability to help than a layperson, so we logically have a duty to give some of our wealth 
away to others who do not have it, when doing so would not present a significant bur-
den to ourselves and would significantly improve the lives of those to whom we give. 
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If the motivating force behind giving is not the “warm glow,” as Peter Singer has been 
known to put it, but the chance to materially reduce suffering in the world, it seems 
only logical that we should be attentive to the effectiveness of our donations. 
Attending to this effectiveness, however, can be a steeper challenge than it initially 
seems. As Andrew Kuper points out in his article, “More Than Charity,” “nothing in 
the principle of aid or charity determines that the right action in any or all contexts is 
donation”1. To truly be effective in our altruism, we need to be able to recognize situa-
tions in which charitable giving is not the right answer, and where it may in fact cause 
harm. As Keith Horton notes in his article “Aid Agencies: The Epistemic Question,” 
“Many contributors to this debate have apparently taken it that one may simply assume 
that the effects of the work such agencies do are overwhelmingly positive … however, 
one finds a number of concerns about such agencies and the work they do that put that 
assumption in serious doubt”2.
Emily Clough takes the argument one step further in her article, “Effective Altruism’s 
Political Blind Spot,” in the Boston Review. Efficacy in aid is particularly thorny and 
difficult to determine. Not only is it difficult to get good data, but even the darling 
methods of randomized control trials (RCTs) that effective altruist organizations like 
GiveWell and Giving What We Can use produce distinctly skewed results3. She says, 
While they are good at measuring the proximate effects of a program on its 
immediate target subjects, RCTs are bad at detecting any unintended effects of 
a program, especially those effects that fall outside the population or timeframe 
that the organization or researchers had in mind. For example, an RCT might 
determine whether a bed net distribution program lowered the incidence 
of malaria among its target population. But it would be less likely to capture 
whether the program unintentionally demobilized political pressures on the 
government to build a more effective malaria eradication program, one that 
would ultimately affect more people. RCTs thus potentially miss broader 
insights and side effects of a program beyond its target population4.
1  Kuper, Andrew. “More Than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the “Singer Solution”.” Ethics and 
International Affairs 16, no. 1 (2002): 113, 107-120. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-7093.2002.tb.00378.x.
2  Horton, Keith. “Aid Agencies: The Epistemic Question.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 28, no. 1 (2010): 
29, 29-43. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2010.00504.x.
3  Clough, Emily. “Effective Altruism’s Political Blind Spot.” Boston Review, 14 Jul 2015.
4  Ibid.
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The critical point here is that there is a political dimension to poverty that is ignored in 
the standard process effective altruists use to target their giving. Given this blind spot, 
the aid that effective altruists provide risks actually worsening some systemic problems, 
as Clough goes on to describe: 
In the worst case, the presence of NGOs induces exit from the state sector. When 
relatively efficient, well-functioning NGOs enter a health or education market, 
for example, citizens in that market who are paying attention are likely to switch 
from government services to NGO services. The result is a disengagement 
of the most mobilized, discerning poor citizens from the state. These are the 
citizens most likely to have played a previous role in monitoring the quality of 
state services and advocating for improvements. Once they exit, the pressure 
on the government to maintain and improve services eases, and the quality of 
government provision is likely to fall5.
Iason Gabriel, in his article “Effective Altruism and its Critics,” describes yet another 
scenario where effective altruism’s cost-effectiveness analysis can fall short. He recounts 
a hypothetical situation where a charity has the option to build a water sanitation sys-
tem using either outside labor or members of the recipient community to construct it6. 
The outside laborers, since they are professionals, will surely build a better system that 
will be less likely to need repair in the near future, making them the more cost-effective 
investment7. However, as Gabriel points out, this leaves no room in the calculus for the 
emotional investment of the community in the project if allowed to build the system 
themselves8. He says, “we might believe that it is valuable for people to choose the path 
their community takes and to participate in realising these goals, for reasons of auton-
omy and self-esteem. After all, there is an important moral difference between a receiv-
ing something as a gift and bringing it into existence through one’s effort”9.
Steven G. Brown adds to the discussion in his article, “Supporting the Best Charities is 
Harder than it Seems,” wherein he describes how GiveWell’s methodology leads them 
5  Ibid.
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to “to rule out effective organizations that would do great work with further funding”10. 
Specifically, he argues,
GiveWell focuses on charitable work that is clearly measurable, ruling out crucial 
work that is not easily measured. By setting up experiments, they select projects 
that have clear, small-scale deliverables that can be easily counted. This usually leads 
them to medical and health programs such as vaccinations and clean water methods. 
GiveWell’s methodology prioritizes easily measurable metrics, and those outcomes 
that can also be researched and tracked in a particularly rigorous way. This leads to 
their most serious drawback: overlooking projects that should be a high priority, 
but are difficult to measure. When one takes a step back and asks what it would take 
to better a place that is not doing well, one will surely come across many difficult 
to measure answers. For example, it is striking that since it began giving ratings in 
2008, GiveWell has only recommended a single international educational charity. 
Pratham is an organization that runs an innovative and extraordinarily successful 
reading program called Read India that trains community volunteers to be teachers 
in villages all across the country. Citing difficulties in measuring the effectiveness of 
educational projects, GiveWell stopped recommending Pratham in 2011, and has 
never recommended another educational charity since. This is despite the fact that 
education is certainly one of the most important things a community must have if 
it is to rise out of poverty and not merely survive11.
Clearly, the narrow approach effective altruists have taken regarding charitable aid has sig-
nificant drawbacks. Not only is its efficacy hard to determine, but the narrow focus rules out 
some areas which ought not be ignored. Given that I accept the first premises of effective 
altruism, namely, that we ought to do something to reduce suffering in the world and that 
we ought to attend to the efficacy of the actions we take for that purpose, it now may seem 
unclear what kind of action a would-be effective altruist should take against this suffering. 
What other methods are available?
When the question of aid’s effect is unclear, we may better serve those who are suffer-
ing with ascetic responses than with donation. It might be hard to control where donated 
money goes, and what its effects are once it goes there. But if we identify the sources of 
harm, starving these sources of our tacit, unquestioned approval will eventually lead to 
system-wide change. 
10  Brown, Steven G. “Supporting the Best Charities is Harder than it Seems.” Journal of Global Ethics 12, 
no. 2 (2016): 242, 240-244. doi: 10.1080/17449626.2016.1205118.
11  Ibid.
Volume 18, Issue 1Essays in Philosophy
6 | eP1575 Essays in Philosophy
The causes of suffering can be difficult to identify and target for change through dona-
tion. This is in part because the Third World is created by the same economics that 
produced the First World, as Thomas Pogge describes in his article, “Responsibilities 
for Poverty Related Ill-Health.” The global order is such that Western culture remains 
as dominant and influential as it was in the colonial era, and therefore, the “existing 
institutional order is implicated in the persistence of radical inequality [where the] 
better-off impose a shared institutional order on the worse-off ”12. Donation alone 
will not be sufficient to remedy such system-wide structural violence. Against such 
sources of suffering, it may be helpful to take the ascetic’s approach instead. As Kuper 
says, “Given the complex interdependence and economic and political perversities that 
characterize our shared world, the injunction ‘first, do no harm’ deserves at least equal 
consideration”13. 
Indeed, I think most effective altruists would not have a problem admitting this. When 
presented with the evidence that giving will not do good in one case, the effective 
altruist may simply redirect those potential funds toward a situation in which he or she 
can feel more sure that it will be of benefit. Perhaps, the effective altruist will choose to 
donate to developing technologies to protect humanity from cataclysm due to global 
warming or to medical research aimed at lifesaving drugs or eradicating disease. These 
are more concrete and technological sources of suffering and better suited, perhaps, 
to cost-effectiveness reasoning. Even so, I propose that this thinking leaves the effec-
tive altruist equation incomplete. Charitable giving is not our only opportunity to take 
altruistic action. Focusing solely on that misses an opportunity to expand the influence 
of our ethical lives.
The Case for Selective Ascetic Activism
Effective altruism’s focus on money may blind the movement to ways in which the 
world can be improved by non-monetary or ascetic means. This focus on money and 
donation amounts to a kind of tunnel vision. To give an example: within the attempts 
to address the global warming crisis, supporting the development of alternative fuels 
for cars or better electric cars is a perennial favorite. Yet, new forms of cars or fuel pale 
in comparison to the effects on climate change that could be produced from simply re-
ducing the need for cars at all. Developing better, more efficient, public transport would 
12  Pogge, Thomas. “Responsibilities for Poverty Related Ill-Health.” Ethics & International Affairs 16, no. 
2 (2002): 71, 71-79. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-7093.2002.tb00398.x.
13  Kuper, Andrew. “More Than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the “Singer Solution”.” Ethics and 
International Affairs 16, no. 1 (2002): 114, 107-120. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-7093.2002.tb.00378.x.
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have a much more drastic impact. Better still, we could redesign cities and transport to 
not rely as heavily on cars at all and adjust the culture to move away from seeing cars as 
basic needs (as they are often seen in the United States) and more as expensive luxuries. 
Individuals can propel change of this kind with investments or donations (the typical 
effective altruist approach), but can also practice this by abstaining from the use of cars, 
or planes, making the choice to take public transport or walk or bike to places they 
need to go, or traveling less in general. 
Other ascetic methods of fighting climate change are simply becoming vegetarian or 
vegan, since large amounts of greenhouse gases are produced through factory farming. 
In fact, a report by World Watch (2009) found that more than half of all greenhouse 
gases are produced from the animal agriculture industries14. And an Oxford study pro-
duced in 2014 by the journal, Climatic Change, concluded that meat-eaters are respon-
sible for almost twice as many dietary greenhouse-gas emissions per day as vegetarians 
and about two and a half times as many as vegans15. Another option for selective asceti-
cism is to personally choose not to have children, to reduce the burden of overpopula-
tion. One need not take up every ascetic choice, but these options deserve at least as 
much recognition and attention as charitable donation. 
I recognize this is not an entirely novel thing to say, as even Peter Singer in his book, 
The Most Good You Can Do, states that one of the most effective ways to decrease total 
suffering in the world is to stop buying or eating meat16. That is why I see my argument 
in this paper as a reemphasis, rather than a revolutionary suggestion. In fact, there are 
already efforts being made in this regard. We just tend not to hear about them in con-
nection with effective altruism. Movements like conscious consumerism seek to better 
inform customers of the ethical impact of their purchases. 
In Waheed Houssain’s article, “Is Ethical Consumerism an Impermissible Form of Vigi-
lantism?” he gives a thorough evaluation of several types of ethical consumerism. Citi-
zens can use their purchasing power in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons. A 
conscious consumer may refrain from buying coffee produced by unfairly treated work-
14  Goodland, Robert and Jeff Anhang. “Livestock and Climate Change.” World Watch, November/
December 2009.
15  Scarborough, Peter, Paul N. Appleby, Anja Mizdrak, et al. “Dietary greenhouse gas emissions of meat-
eaters, fish-eaters, vegetarian and vegans in the UK.” Climatic Change 125, no. 2 (2014): 179-192. doi: 
10.1007/s10584-014-1169-1.
16  Singer, Peter. The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism Is Changing Ideas about Living 
Ethically. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015, 177.
Volume 18, Issue 1Essays in Philosophy
8 | eP1575 Essays in Philosophy
ers, or they may avoid products known to contribute to deforestation or the extinction of 
species in distant regions, what Houssain calls “negative ethical consumerism” because it 
involves refraining from buying something17. Conscious consumers can also take action 
to make the world a better place by purchasing products that have been recognized as fair 
trade or sustainable, what Houssain would call “positive ethical consumerism”18. 
If we accept that one of the engines of inequality and suffering in the world is rampant 
consumerism, then abstaining from consumerism in any way possible will help to effect 
change. Strategically abstaining from consumerism can attack the roots of these prob-
lems, especially when combined with advocacy and public pressure on companies that 
use unfair labor practices, cause deforestation, use child labor, and more.
This type of activism would be a kind of negative ethical consumerism aimed at creating 
systemic change, what Houssain dubs a kind of “proto-legislative” social change ethical 
consumerism (SCEC)19. The use of such strategies “essentially creates arenas of informal 
democratic self-governance that operate below the level of formal democratic politics”20. 
Houssain elaborates on the benefits of ethical consumer action:
In a large, complex, and technologically sophisticated society, citizens cannot 
make all of the rules necessary to direct market activity to desirable outcomes 
through the formal legislative and regulatory process. As things stand, when 
issues do not make it on to the formal democratic agenda, they are left to the 
unregulated market. But with proto-legislative SCEC, citizens can address issues 
that need attention but do not get on the formal agenda through informal self-
regulation in secondary arenas21.
This type of activism can have many benefits, like helping to bring attention to issues that 
are “perpetually secondary” (like deforestation), and fostering a “legislative will” where 
citizens can organize themselves on issues that languish in formal politics22. 
17  Houssain, Waheed. “Is Ethical Consumerism an Impermissable Form of Vigilantism?” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 40, no. 2 (2012): 113, 111-143. doi: 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2012.01218.x.
18  Ibid.
19  Ibid.
20  Ibid, 132.
21  Ibid.
22  Ibid.
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He continues:
A closely related benefit is increased governability. Corporations are 
powerful social actors, with privileged access to political authorities, and 
they often oppose laws that would protect the rights and interests of weaker 
players in the market. But the orientation of corporations is closely connected 
with the orientation of consumers. If consumers are narrowly interested in 
price and quality, without regard for how a firm delivers these goods, then 
firms stand to profit from reduced protections for weaker players. But if 
consumers are sensitive to whether a firm respects the rights and interests 
of others, there will be less profit to be made in taking advantage of weaker 
players, and this in turn will make firms less hostile to regulatory efforts to 
protect these players23.
A final benefit of proto-legislative SCEC is that it can “expand the sphere of citizen 
engagement”24. Someone who does not identify with any political party or have 
general views about economic policy may still find it quite natural to express his or 
her wishes for the common good through everyday purchases. Websites like Ethi-
calConsumer.org provide an abundance of articles and data regarding the ethical 
influence of consumer choices with the aim of providing consumers the tools they 
need to make such decisions. Such sources of information may lead interested con-
sumers to eventually take more active roles in democratic politics25.
Though the kind of proto-legislative SCEC Houssain describes encompasses both 
positive and negative forms of ethical consumerism, I have chosen to focus on the 
negative form for this article, because it is often under explored and underutilized. 
Lumping selective asceticism in as one subcategory of ethical consumerism is 
misleading, since by its nature it is anti-consumerism. Thus, strategies like this can 
benefit from having their own name. Asceticism as activism aimed at creating sys-
temic social change should be seen as a form of effective altruism in its own right 
and deserves attention as such. 
23  Ibid, 133.
24  Ibid.
25  Ibid.
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Against Earning to Give
As we’ve established, effective altruists are interested in (1) helping others and (2) do-
ing so effectively. The earning to give sub-trend accepts that the best way to do so is 
donation to effective charities, and seeks to maximize their power to do so by seeking 
careers with the most financial potential. But as I have demonstrated, we have serious 
reason to question the faith effective altruists have placed in the benefits of donation. 
This would seem to undermine the “giving” part of earning to give. But as we shall 
see next, there is reason to question the “earning” side as well.  
Even if we give away massive sums to good causes (and even if these causes are effec-
tive), if we are not conscious of the kinds of systems to which we are giving our life 
and our time, we may be missing important elements of the moral picture. To give 
a hypothetical comparison, if you make a living slaughtering animals, but donate all 
your earnings above subsistence level to vegan causes … are you doing the most good 
you can? 
To be clear, I am not arguing that charitable donation is never a suitable option for 
altruistic action. There are some cases where it can be both appropriate and effec-
tive. For instance, in combating deaths due to malaria, donating to researching and 
distributing treatment and to organizations which help prevent its spread may help to 
ultimately consign malaria to the dustbin of history. Yet, the zeal with which effective 
altruism has approached charitable giving is likely inflated and inappropriate. Dona-
tion can be one tool among many in the effective altruist’s toolbox, but we should be 
very careful and attentive to the situations in which it is applied and willing to recog-
nize its limits. 
I am also not advocating a life of complete disengagement from the world. The kind 
of asceticism I am proposing is selective, targeted to remove support from the unjust 
systems in the world that profit from the exploitation of others and of the planet. As-
ceticism is not the only way to respond to these issues, but it is a tool that is too often 
neglected.
As for earning to give, it may be appropriate for a select few. But blanket approval for 
any job that allows you wealth and status is dangerous, no matter how altruistically 
one applies the wealth and status once achieved. Careers are not all morally neutral 
activities. Indeed, some careers may be neither helpful nor harmful to the world, but 
to an effective altruist interested in maximizing one’s positive influence, the ethical 
potential of all the hours we spend working should not be ignored. This would seem 
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to place the preference back on the jobs we usually think of as morally admirable – 
working directly for aid agencies, becoming an activist or advocate for the worse off, 
becoming a doctor, etc. There is extra reason to be wary of the earning to give. High-
paying jobs and high-status jobs often are high-paying and high-status because they 
are key positions in the very economics that maintain the First World-Third World 
status quo. As I have already established, this system itself is implicated in the struc-
tural violence that causes so much harm in the first place. 
Ascetic strategies, on the other hand, like refusing to participate in consumerism 
which perpetuates the First World-Third World divide or giving up meat to reduce 
both greenhouse gases and prevent animal suffering can potentially transform soci-
ety so that these causes of suffering eventually cease to exist. Asceticism is a form of 
activism in this way, and can be a form of public protest, and can help to establish 
and promote alternative ways of living.
Take, for example, the somewhat recent scandal around the chocolate industry, as 
seen in the 2010 documentary, The Dark Side of Chocolate. When we hear about 
something like a chocolate company using child labor to acquire their cocoa, we 
have a choice to make. Is cheap and readily available chocolate more important to us 
than the exploitation of a child? What can we do in a situation like this to help make 
the world more like we would like it to be? Here, we have a good example of why 
activism ought to be partnered with asceticism. Donating to charities that can help 
children in the Third World is only half the solution; we must also stop buying the 
products that come from their exploitation. By recognizing these other strategies, we 
may be able to enlist more people in the fight to reduce suffering in the world. 
Some effective altruists will defend earning to give by arguing that if a person rejects 
a high-paying job in banking or finance on ethical grounds, this does nothing to 
prevent someone else from taking that job. Further, the person who does take the job 
may be less likely to donate what the effective altruist would, and less likely to advo-
cate for reform from within the system. 
To this, I will concede some ground. In the situation where an altruistic individual 
has the talent and opportunity, I would not automatically condemn the acceptance 
of such a career choice. Yet, I would also be keen to point out that donating all the 
money earned from such a job to effective charities does not go far enough. The em-
phasis for the truly effective altruist interested in earning to give needs to be on the 
creation of systemic institutional change. Thus, I would argue that for such individu-
als, advocacy for reform from within should be the primary target when making such 
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a career choice. If such advocacy is effective, then the negative effects of the career 
choice would vanish, and so would my objections.
Yet, I think it is worth pointing out that careers come with cultures and social pres-
sures of their own. Our moral motivations are often influenced by our social groups, 
so we should cultivate those groups carefully. It would be arrogant to assume that we 
are immune to the potentially negative effects of peer pressure just because we go in 
with good intentions. Changing the system from within is an admirable goal, but much 
harder to accomplish than many people may assume. Individuals who have interest in 
the path of earning to give should undertake it with due consideration. 
Addressing the “Overdemandingness” Objection
Effective altruism may indeed have an undue emphasis on donation and a potentially 
counter-productive love affair with earning to give. However, its central claims remain 
unchallenged, even when these two expressions of the movement fall apart. One com-
mon objection levied at the very heart of effective altruism is the worry that it is overly 
demanding. Even the ascetic strategies I am proposing are open to this accusation. 
Being informed enough about the wide ranging effects of our everyday purchases, the 
ethical influence of our jobs upon the world, and of every choice we make regarding 
where to place our money and our time is a steep task. Some worry that such a high 
standard of ethical behavior would actually reduce the value of our lives.
This fear is echoed by Kuper in his objection to Peter Singer. Kuper fears that Singer’s 
suggestions will prompt any of us who wish to lead ethical lives to “give up any job that 
doesn’t directly or maximally involve saving lives”26. Kuper argues, “there are many 
values other than survival: Can it be morally required to give up vital sources of mean-
ing, such as the work we do, the social commitments we have, and the knowledge and 
excellences we pursue?”27.
The objection stems, perhaps, from the effective altruist slogan which is the title of one 
of Peter Singer’s recent books, The Most Good You Can Do. This is the battle-cry of the 
effective altruist. Worries of overdemandingness arise from the first half of the phrase. 
Doing the “most good” possible seems to imply that this is a never ending task. Indeed, 
for effective altruists it is a never ending obligation. Yet, I find the overdemandingness 
26  Kuper, Andrew. “More Than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the “Singer Solution”.” Ethics and 
International Affairs 16, no. 1 (2002): 110, 107-120. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-7093.2002.tb.00378.x.
27  Ibid.
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objection implausible because there are many activities and obligations we accept in 
life that are similarly never ending. For example, it is widely accepted that we ought to 
maintain our health. It may not be seen as a moral obligation, but it is an obligation 
we accept despite the fact that none of us will ever be able to achieve a state of perfect 
health and sustain it ad infinitum.  
Most of us do not see maintaining our health as overly demanding and we know that 
despite our best efforts to stay healthy, we will still inevitably fall sick and even die at 
some point. We don’t see this as somehow undermining the value of trying to be as 
healthy as we can while we still live. This is because it is so clearly vital to the other 
things we care about in our lives. Everything else we enjoy, we enjoy longer and more 
fully when we’re healthy. I would argue the same for the kind of ethical attentiveness 
that effective altruists adopt. Those who believe effective altruism is overly demand-
ing focus on the “doing the most good” part and neglect second half of that phrase 
which constrains it. Doing the most good one can is the same level of demandingness 
as being as healthy as one can be. It allows room for balancing effective altruism with 
other values and activities. The selective asceticism I am advocating here is likewise 
able to preserve the kinds of things we commonly hold dear in life. We can still enjoy 
all manner of pursuits, like art, or music, writing novels, etc. as long as we care enough 
to ensure these activities do not harm others. We need not perceive these activities as 
“time wasted” that we could have spent helping others, or earning more in order to give 
more away.
Just as one can select between worthy causes to which to donate, one can also select 
between various ascetic practices. For some of us, being vegan could be too taxing on 
our personal health, and for others to abstain from having children would bring severe 
emotional pain. We need not all live the life of a childless bicycling vegan. Yet, we can 
and should think strategically about our “negative” ethical options. For those of us who 
would not suffer from such forms of asceticism, it can be a powerful tool to effect posi-
tive change in the world. For those of us who would suffer, there are still a host of other 
opportunities to make a difference, and these tend to be the ones we already know 
about – volunteering, donating to charities, etc. 
As Anthony Skelton observes in his article, “The Ethical Principles of Effective Altru-
ism,” what truly unites the effective altruist community is a common perspective char-
acterized by:
First, a heightened receptivity to evidence and facts in thinking about how 
best to achieve philanthropic ends. Second, effective altruists have, perhaps 
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unwittingly, hit on a sensible way of … reconciling prudence and beneficence; 
they appear to have stumbled on what psychologists have been reporting, that 
above a certain threshold increases in income and wealth produce fewer and 
less long-lasting increases in life satisfaction. Effective altruists have discovered 
that for happiness, for life satisfaction, one needs much less materially than our 
cultural norms suggest28.
In reality, the effective altruist life is not a life so burdened as to be devoid of any plea-
sure. In fact, altruism and asceticism go hand in hand to produce more happiness for 
effective altruists themselves, as well as helping to alleviate suffering for others in the 
world.
Conclusion
Effective altruism gets many things right: we have a duty to help others, no matter how 
distant, and we have the privileged position in the West that our spare change can make 
significant impact on those far away. It is good to bring attention to the moral potential 
of our money, but it is short-sighted to think that some of the problems of the world 
can be solved merely by donating. Because of the emphasis on “effectiveness,” it should 
be natural for effective altruism to seek solutions that prevent harm rather than just 
ameliorate it after the fact, which is why it is strange that ascetic strategies are often so 
neglected. 
Effective altruism as a movement has developed an unhealthy obsession with cost-
effectiveness analysis and randomized controlled trials, which has led them away from 
what should be their core mission. It has left the movement unable to spot effective 
solutions to systemic sources of suffering, which often have political dimensions that 
are hard to measure with the quantitative approaches the movement favors. However, 
none of these flaws are fatal. Donating to effective charities has only ever been a part of 
the broader cause and it is time to give more attention to the other approaches avail-
able. The first rule of getting out of a hole is to stop digging. This is what the ascetic’s 
approach to effective altruism seeks to reemphasize. This is also what the earning to 
give trend seems to neglect. Both the earning to give approach and extreme asceticism 
to the point of complete disengagement from society fail to effect positive change in the 
world in a maximal way. I am arguing for what I see as the middle way, where attention 
is devoted equally to the effects our money can have on the world and to the nature of 
28  Skelton, Anthony. “The Ethical Principles of Effective Altruism.” Journal of Global Ethics 12, no. 2, 
(2016): 144, 137-146. doi: 10.1080/17449626.2016.1193552.
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the activities to which we devote our time. In doing that, we have the opportunity to 
create a more just and fair global order, and reduce the negative impact of structural 
violence.
This places a burden on us to be informed of the far-reaching consequences both of our 
actions and of our inactions. The most effective altruistic life will be demanding, but 
not incongruous with our other values. We must seek out opportunities to help oth-
ers, and we must stop contributing to systems which harm them. Through a balance of 
selective asceticism and cost-effective charitable donations we have huge and mostly 
untapped potential to transform our world. We don’t need to think our actions will 
create a perfect world in order for them to be worth doing. Making the world a better 
place should not be seen as a burdensome addition to our lives, but rather an enrich-
ing dimension. Looking after our positive impact on the world is like looking after our 
own health. It is negative and counterproductive when we become obsessive about it, 
but, for most of us, it is important enough to devote daily activity toward, through both 
positive actions and selective abstinence. 29
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